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Abstract—Federated learning is a decentralized machine learn-
ing technique that evokes widespread attention in both the
research field and the real-world market. However, the current
privacy-preserving federated learning scheme only provides a
secure way for the users to contribute their private data but
never leaves a way to withdraw the contribution to model update.
Such an irreversible setting potentially breaks the regulations
about data protection and increases the risk of data extraction.
To resolve the problem, this paper describes a novel concept for
federated learning, called memorization elimination. Based on the
concept, we propose Forsaken, a federated learning framework
that allows the user to eliminate the memorization of its private
data in the trained model. Specifically, each user in Forsaken
is deployed with a trainable dummy gradient generator. After
steps of training, the generator can produce dummy gradients to
stimulate the neurons of a machine learning model to eliminate
the memorization of the specific data. Also, we prove that the
additional memorization elimination service of Forsaken does not
break the common procedure of federated learning or lower its
security.
Index Terms—Federated Learning, Memorization Elimination,
Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the improved security and high efficiency, federated
learning arises to the star of decentralized learning overwhelm-
ingly as soon as being proposed [1]. In 2019, the research team
of Google announced that the federated learning technique
had reached the state to solve the applied learning problems
over tens of millions level real-world users, and anticipates
for the usage in billion-level applications [2]. Not surprisingly,
federated learning shall lead the trend of decentralized online
learning in the future market. More applications that deploy
machine learning as a service can save a significant amount
of costs on model training by utilizing federated learning.
Despite being popular, federated learning is still faced
with a variety of security and application challenges, such as
defending the user data reconstruction attack [3] and adapting
federated learning to some specific application scenarios [4],
[5]. In fact, these widely focused challenges can be concluded
as one point, i.e., how to make federated learning securely
and efficiently memorize the training data. However, compared
to “memorize”, the reversed process, “forget”, seems to be
neglected because of the difficulty to extract specific memo-
rization from a trained model. As a result, there is now neither
an effective way left for the user to withdraw the uploaded
private data or a uniform indicator to evaluate the “forget”
state.
The recently released data protection regulations, e.g., the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United
States [6] and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in the European Union [7], clearly rule that the user should
have the right to withdraw his private data if there is no
special statement in the user agreement. These rules imply
that the lack of forgetting mechanism for federated learning
potentially violates the regulations and overlooks the fairness
of the user to control its private data freely. Moreover, the
training set of the user in federated learning may contain some
unintended data that are private but not really useful to improve
model accuracy. The memorization of the trained model about
these unintended data greatly increases the possibility of the
adversary to extract the user’s private information. Take the
language model as an example. The adversary can recover an
inadvertently inserted sequence that is fully memorized after
only 104 attempts [8]. In principle, there is none directive way
for the server to manage the unintended memorization in the
trained model. However, we can utilize an indirect method to
resolve the problem, that is, making the user to withdraw the
memorization of the trained model about the data required to
be eliminated, which is referred as memorization elimination
in this paper. Based on the method, the user can lower the risk
of privacy leakage as much as possible.
To achieve memorization elimination, we propose Forsaken
in this paper. Forsaken mainly achieves the following two
breakthroughs: 1) it provides an efficient way to implement
user-level memorization elimination for federated learning;
2) it defines a new indicator to evaluate the performance
of memorization elimination. For memorization elimination,
Forsaken implements it through a trainable generator. When a
user needs to conduct memorization elimination, the generator
is invoked to generate dummy gradients by learning the state
of the trained model. The dummy gradient can be accumulated
to the trained model in a similar way to the gradient computed
based on the normal method used in most federated learning
scheme, e.g., stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [1]. Therefore,
our memorization elimination dose not break the common
procedure of federated learning, and can also fit the existing
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2gradient privacy protection methods, such as [9], [10], [11].
The difference is that the normal gradient is used to improve
the overall performance of the target model but the dummy
gradient is used to stimulate the neuron units of the machine
learning model to eliminate the memorization of the specific
data. After giving a memorization elimination method, the
current dilemma is that there is none of a quantified way to
evaluate its performance. For this purpose, Forsaken defines
forgetting rate to experimentally evaluate memorization elim-
ination. By combining the concept of membership inference
for machine learning [12], forgetting rate can well describes
the rate of the data that are successfully eliminated from the
memorization of the target model.
The contributions of this paper are summarized below.
• Revocable Federated Learning. We propose Forsaken,
a federated learning framework that supports the user to
manage the trained model’s memorization about its data
independently. Particularly, the memorization manage-
ment does not need to retrain the machine learning model
or break the common procedure of federated learning.
• Memorization Elimination. We formally give a novel
definition of memorization elimination for federated
learning, which contains a quantified indicator to measure
the performance of memorization elimination, called for-
getting rate. The indicator is derived from a current hot
research spot, membership inference, and can be easily
computed for an inspector.
• Learn to Forget. We design a trainable generator that
can stimulate the machine learning model to eliminate the
memorization of the specific data by learning the state of
the target model to generate dummy gradients.
• Performance Evaluation. We implement Forsaken on
five standard machine learning datasets to evaluate its
performance. The results show that when we eliminate
the memorization of 10 users’ 200 samples (about 1% of
the whole training set), Forsaken can averagely achieve
87.49% forgetting rate, and only cause less than 5%
accuracy loss of the target model on the remaining data.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly overview the essential technical
backgrounds of federated learning and membership oracle.
A. Federated learning
Federated learning is a kind of online machine learning
framework that protects the privacy of training data providers
from the “gradient” level [3]. Compared with the conventional
training method with centralized data storage, federated learn-
ing avoids direct access to the private data of users and has
significant advantages in training efficiency because of the
distributed architecture. A standard framework of federated
learning is shown in Fig. 1. Assume that there are m users
U = {u1, u2, ..., um}, each of which owns its local private
data set Di. At the beginning of federated learning, the
central serve S and U agree on an identical machine learning
model architecture and objective function L(·). Then, at each
…
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Fig. 1. A standard framework of federated learning
iteration, each user downloads the parameters of the current
model from S and trains the model with Di based on the
gradient descent method. The model updates (i.e., gradients)
obtained by each user are subsequently returned to S, who
averages the updates from all users and accumulates them to
the current model according to the following equation.
θk+1 ← θk − η 1
N
m∑
i=1
ni · ∇L(fθk(Di), θk), (1)
where θk is the parameters of the model fθk trained for k
iterations; η controls the learning rate; ∇L(fθk(Di), θk) is
the gradient uploaded by ui at the kth iteration; ni is number
of training samples owned by ui; and N =
∑m
i=1 ni. In
such a way, federated learning implements distribute model
training without uploading the user’s private data, which
greatly decreases the risk of privacy leakage.
Gradient Privacy. In federated learning, the gradient com-
puted by each user is not completely secure. Through the
generative adversarial network [13] or just a simple gradient
optimizer [3], the adversary can reconstruct the private data
from the gradient. To overcome the problem, the core idea
of the existing methods [9], [10], [11] is as follows. First,
before the gradient is sent to the server, the user masks it with
the cryptographic tool, e.g., differential privacy [9] or secret
sharing [10]. Then, the server (the adversary under the security
model) aggregates the masked gradients and accumulates the
result to the current model. During the process, the server
cannot access any gradient of a specific user but obtain the
final aggregated result. In this way, the success rate of such an
attack can be reduced to be very slim. For security, we have to
ensure that the above gradient privacy protection method can
be applied to Forsaken, even when memorization elimination
is invoked.
B. Membership Oracle
The goal of a membership oracle for machine learning is
to determine the attribution of a certain sample, as defined in
Definition 1 [14].
DEFINITION 1 (MEMBERSHIP ORACLE). Given a trained
machine learning model fθ and an arbitrary sample x, an ideal
2
3membership oracle ψ outputs 1 if x belongs to the training set
of fθ; otherwise, outputs 0.
Initially, the membership oracle is intensively used as the
membership inference attacker towards breaking the member-
ship privacy of machine learning [14]. In Forsaken, we utilize
it as the tool to evaluate the performance of memorization
elimination. Up to now, the target-shadow method proposed
by Shokri et al. [14] and its variants [12], [15] are still the
mainstream to implement a membership oracle. Concretely,
the inspector (or attacker) I collects a shadow data set coming
from the same distribution as the training set used for the
target model, and then, trains a shadow model with the shadow
data set. Next, I uses the confidence vectors predicted by
the shadow model for some members and non-members of
the shadow model’s training set to train a binary classifier.
Taking a sample’s confidence vector predicted by the target
model as input, the binary classifier can infer whether the
sample is a member of the training set for the target model
or not, which is precisely a membership oracle. Note that the
existing membership inference method can only be used in the
classification task. Thus, unless stated, the machine learning
models mentioned in the following paper are all classifiers by
default. The research for the regression task is left for future
work.
III. WHAT IS MEMORIZATION ELIMINATION?
In this section, we introduce the meaning of memorization
elimination. Further, we describe the adversary model and de-
sign goals for implementing secure memorization elimination
in federated learning.
A. Motivation
Due to the excellent performance in both security and effect,
federated learning reaches an unprecedented range of applica-
tions in the decentralized machine learning field. However,
the mainstream of existing works about federated learning is
still limited to how to make a model securely and effectively
“memorize” something, e.g., enhancing the security and effi-
ciency of gradient uploading [16] or extending the practicality
of federated learning in some special scenarios [17], [18]. The
reversed process, which we call memorization elimination, still
stays in a blank stage.
Motivating Examples: Our study is first motivated by the
practical requirement of federated learning. Up to now, feder-
ated learning is still a one-way trip for the user. Once a user has
ever contributed its private data, no route of retreat is provided
to withdraw the memorization of the trained model about these
data. As mentioned before, such an irreversible setting on data
memorization leaves a potential risk of violating some national
data protection regulations while applying federated learning
for applications..
Moreover, the lack of data forgetting mechanism increases
the possibility of user data leakage. Consider a commonly
discussed scenario of federated learning, training a generative
sequence model on a text dataset used for automated sentence
completion. Ideally, the dataset should not contain any rare-
but-sensitive information about some individual users; alterna-
tively, the trained model should not have strong memorization
about this information and never emits it as sentence comple-
tion. In particular, if a user accidentally uses a sentence with
the prefix “My bank password is ...” update the model, the
output of the trained model would not predict the exact number
in the suffix of the user’s text as the most-likely completion
when another user types the same prefix. Unfortunately, the
research of [8] points out that it is hard for the current training
environment to achieve the ideal condition, and the adversary
can exploit this loophole to extract the sensitive information
of the user efficiently. From the perspective of the real-world
application, a general method to overcome the problem is
to allow the user to check its data list used for federated
learning and selectively withdraw the memorization of the
trained model about these sensitive data.
Memorization Elimination: To explain what memorization
elimination means for federated learning, we first illustrate
what the memorization is for machine learning. Abstractly,
the training process of a machine learning model is simply
the memorization enhancement process. Through a series of
iterative learning steps, the neurons of a machine learning
model obtain some forms of memorization about the pattern
of the training set; even the pattern of the training is ran-
domized [19]. Further, a trained model intends to output what
is in accordance with its memorization, i.e., strongly suggest
what training data is used (see the concept of membership
oracle [12], [14]). Moreover, take the classification task as
an example. We can reasonably derive Definition 2 that if
some samples are “totally forgotten”, the model can only guess
the samples’ categories; in other words, the model will not
specifically suggest these samples to be any category.
DEFINITION 2. For a p-classification machine learning task,
we say that a sample x is totally forgotten by a machine learn-
ing model fθ if the confidence vector (y1, y2, ..., yp) = fθ(x)
satisfies y1 ≈ y2 ≈ ... ≈ yp ≈ 1p .
Inspired by the above illustration, the memorization elim-
ination for federated learning can be roughly understood as
forcing a trained model to forget the pattern of the specific
private data owned by the user. Referring to [8], we treat
the private data required to be withdrawn as out-of-scope
training data, which are usually a tiny part of the whole
training data. Federated learning is not intended to make the
model memorize any such data as soon as the memorization
elimination operation is called. Based on the principle, we
present the following definition, k-elimination, i.e., conducting
memorization elimination at the kth iteration.
DEFINITION 3 (k-ELIMINATION). Given a machine learn-
ing model fθk−1 trained after k − 1 iterations, a membership
oracle ψ, a training set D and an elimination dataset D′ ⊂ D,
k-elimination is perfectly performed if there exists an elimi-
nation function ϕ that can output fθk = ϕ(fθk−1) where for
each x ∈ D′, we have ψ(fθk−1(x)) = 1 and ψ(fθk(x)) = 0;
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Fig. 2. k-elimination: Express the training steps of federated learning as a time sequence. k-elimination implements that before tk , the inspector I regards
the model fθk−i as being trained by the whole dataset D; after tk , I regards the model fθk+i as being trained by the eliminated dataset D/D′.
for each x ∈ D, fθk(x) = fθk−1(x).
Suppose that there is an inspector I who owns an ideal
membership oracle. As shown in Fig. 2, Definition 3 rules that
from the perspective of I, the machine learning models ob-
tained after the kth iteration are trained by D/D′; the models
obtained before the iteration are not affected, i.e., protecting
the backward privacy of the eliminated data. We say that
backward privacy is enough because it ensures the final output
model of federated learning does not contain the contributions
of the eliminated data, Furthermore, ideal k-elimination should
have good directivity, that is, it forces the model to forget the
pattern of specific data after a particular iteration but does not
influence the performance on the remaining data.
B. Adversary Model
The adversary model of Forsaken is inherited from the
standard federated learning scheme [10], [20]. The details are
given as follows.
Learning Scenario. Prior to introducing the adversary model,
we describe the entities of the learning scenario in Forsaken.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, there are total m ≥ 2 users and
one central server S that are agreed on the same training
objective in Forsaken. For generality, the data of all users
are assumed to be non-IID distributed (not independent and
identically distributed), which is consistent with the setting of
standard federated learning schemes.
Adversary Description. We assume that the adversary in
Forsaken is secure under the following security assumptions.
1) The adversary basically follows the standard curious-
but-honest model [21], and can be the server or any user.
The curious-but-honest adversary honestly conducts the
predetermined protocol steps but never misses an oppor-
tunity to infer the honest user’s data from the received
legitimate messages.
2) The adversary is restricted from polynomial-time com-
putation capacity. Moreover, we assume that there are
secure channels between the server and the user for
transmitting model updates1.
3) The device of the user (e.g., smartphone) provides con-
fidentiality guarantees for the storage of the local private
1This paper focuses on memorization elimination of federated learning. For
secure channel construction, please refer to [9], [10].
data (both training data and the model) and is physically
secure towards the adversary. Such local isolation is the
premised condition for the security of federated learning.
C. Design Goal.
Forsaken is designed to achieve the following two goals.
GOAL 1 (SECURITY INHERITANCE). Forsaken does not
break the common procedure of federated learning, and mean-
while, ensures that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for a
curious-but-honest adversary A to infer any data of the user.
The first goal is to avoid user privacy leakage, which is
also the goal of the conventional federated learning scheme. In
other words, we have to guarantee that Forsaken is at least as
secure as other federated learning schemes in the curious-but-
honest model. According to our adversary model, the attack
surface of A can only be concentrated on the user gradient.
Therefore, to achieve this goal, Forsaken should be compatible
with the existing secure aggregation schemes to protect the
security of the gradient. Besides the above goal, the other
goal of Forsaken is to provide an additional memorization
elimination service for the user, which is defined below.
GOAL 2 (MEMORIZATION ELIMINATION). An arbitrary
user u0, no matter honest or curious-but-honest, can choose to
conduct k-elimination on his data at any iteration of federated
learning, and the additional operation of k-elimination does
not influence the learning process of other users.
The second goal is to implement secure memorization elimi-
nation based on the k-elimination. Remark that the elimination
function given in Definition 3 is considered to be an ideal
function to achieve our goal. Nevertheless, considering the
meaning of memorization for machine learning, it is not real-
istic to perfectly implement such a function. Alternatively, in
the next section, we define a simple optimizer to approximate
the function.
IV. MEMORIZATION ELIMINATION IN FEDERATED
LEARNING
In this section, we present the design details of memoriza-
tion elimination in Forsaken.
A. Measuring Memorization Elimination
Prior to introducing Forsaken, we define a quantified indica-
tor to measure the performance of the k-elimination method,
called forgetting rate (FR).
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5For both the human brain and machine learning, memoriza-
tion is an abstract concept that is hard to be directly measured.
However, a widely accepted fact is that the memorization can
only be formed from the known objects (the training samples
for machine learning). Even though the human brain or ma-
chine learning can identify a never seen object, the association
ability is derived from the known memorization in some ways.
Thus, if we successfully eliminate the memorization of some
specific data, the most intuitive reflection is that these data
are transformed from “known” to “unknown” as illustrated in
Fig. 2,. In such a case, the eliminated data are ensured to
be no longer related to the memorization of the target model
anymore. Naturally, the transformation rate between “known”
and “unknown”, i.e., FR, can be directly utilized to evaluate the
performance of memorization elimination. To compute FR, it
is necessary to find a tool to identify whether a given sample is
“known” or not. Definition 1 precisely describes such an ideal
tool, that is, membership oracle. Nonetheless, the dilemma
is that none of the existing membership inference algorithms
can implement an ideal membership oracle. Therefore, FR
combines both the performance of the membership oracle
and the transformation rate, which can be mathematically
expressed as the following equation.
FR =
BT
BT +BF
× AF
AT +AF
× 100%, (2)
where the meanings of TP , FN , TN and FP are given in
Table I.
To further understand FR, we can refer to a common evalua-
tion indicator of machine learning, recall rate [22]. In machine
learning, the recall rate is the fraction of the total amount of
positive instances that are correctly classified as “true”. Before
conducting memorization elimination, the positive instances
are the training samples required to be eliminated. BTBT+BF
expresses the recall rate of the membership oracle on these
instances that are correctly identified as “known”. Correspond-
ingly, AFAT+AF indicates the recall rate of the instances that are
correctly transformed to be “unknown” after conducting mem-
orization elimination. Literally speaking, FR gives a qualified
indicator to measure how many samples are changed from the
memorized set (training set) to the unknown set (testing set)
after memorization elimination. Notably, as the computation of
FR involves the inference of a membership oracle that cannot
be owned by a normal user, it is unpractical to directly utilize
FR as an objective function of memorization elimination. To
overcome the problem, we define a new objective function
based on Definition 2 in Section IV-C.
B. Intuition of Memorization Elimination
Our memorization elimination method is originally inspired
by the nature of the human brain. Consider the laws of
human memory. The most intuitive method to make the brain
to forget something is to focus on other things. Similarly,
to make a model eliminate the memorization about some
specific data, the simplest way is to remove these data from
the training set, and then, continue to train the model with
TABLE I
NOTATION TABLE
Notations Descriptions
BT
The number of eliminated training samples that are
predicted to be TRUE by ψ BEFORE conducting ϕ.
BF
The number of eliminated training samples that are
predicted to be FALSE by ψ BEFORE conducting ϕ.
AT
The number of eliminated training samples that are
predicted to be TRUE by ψ AFTER conducting ϕ.
AF
The number of eliminated training samples that are
predicted to be FALSE by ψ AFTER conducting ϕ.
ψ → the membership oracle; ϕ → the k-elimination function.
the remaining dataset. Theoretically, after countless training
steps, the model can gradually weaken the memorization of
the pattern about the removed data. The advantage of such
a natural memorization elimination method is that it causes
little impact on the original performance of the target model.
However, its disadvantage is also obvious, that is, suffering a
great loss in efficiency and practicality. A well-trained model
is designed to have a similar feature to the deep cognition
behaviour of the human brain (e.g., the language ability).
To make a well-trained model forget something in a natural
way, the required time is usually too long to be accepted for
practical applications.
To verify our analysis, we use the natural memorization
elimination method to conduct a simple experiment with the
standard image classification dataset, CIFAR-10. The detailed
experiment setting is as listed in Section VI. In the experiment,
we first train a target model for 25 epochs according to the
federated learning procedure. Then, at the 26th epoch, we
randomly select a user and remove it from the candidate data
provider set. Next, we continue to make the remaining users
train the target model for the same number of epochs as
previous training. The result shown in Fig. 3 state that only
a very little increase on the FR is obtained from the extra
epochs of training, which is consistent to the above analysis.
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Fig. 3. Memorization elimination with the natural method for CIFAR-10.
Memorization elimination occurs at epoch 25..
To overcome the defect of natural memorization elimination,
it is necessary to enhance the “forgetting” strength towards
the data of the selected user. To achieve this goal, we refer
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6to the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) method used for
model updates in federated learning (mathematically expressed
as Eq. 1 in Section II). From Eq. 1, it is observed that
the memorization of a trained model in federated learning
is formed by the gradients uploaded by the users. Therefore,
a forcible method implement memorization elimination is to
withdraw the gradients that the user has contributed for model
update, and the process can be completed in a normal training
epoch of federated learning as given in Eq. 3.
θk+1 ← θk − η 1
N
[
m∑
i=1,i6=u0
∇L(fθk(Di), θk)
+
k∑
j=1
∇L(fθj (D0), θj)].
(3)
where u0 is the user whose data memorization is eliminated
at the kth iteration, and ∇L(fθj (D0), θj) is the gradient
uploaded by u0 at the jth iteration. As shown in Fig. 4, using
the forcible elimination method to implement k-elimination
can indeed achieve a higher FR. However, since the SGD
method used in federated learning is time-sequence related and
irreversible, the performance loss caused by the method on the
target model is also obvious. Although the above method does
not obtain a considerable result, it inspires us to implement
Forsaken from the gradient level.
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Fig. 4. Memorization elimination with the forcible method for CIFAR-10.
Memorization elimination occurs at epoch 40.
C. Generator: Learn to Forget
We now present our memorization elimination methodology
that relies on a trainable generator G.
Dummy Gradient. From the forcible elimination method, we
observe that gradient is a powerful component to influence the
memorization in federated learning. Therefore, Forsaken also
utilizes the gradient to implement memorization elimination.
The difference is that the gradient used for memorization
elimination in Forsaken is not computed based on the normal
gradient method but specially produced by a dummy gradient
generator. Initially, the dummy gradient is initialized with a
series of tiny random values that have the same size as the
normal gradient. By learning the state of the target model, G
successively adapts the dummy gradient to remodel the target
model towards a predefined direction to implement directive
and lossless memorization elimination. The following presents
the principle of G to generate the dummy gradient.
Learn to Forget. The design of dummy gradient generator
G is inspired by the neurological “active forgetting [23]”
mechanism of the human body. Different from the hysteresis of
natural forgetting (also known as “passive forgetting”), active
forgetting is vigorous and can eliminate all traces and engram
cells for a given memory. The active forgetting process is as
follows [23]. To eliminate the specific memorization stored
in the engram cells, human body let the dopamine neurons,
called forgetting cells, to produce a kind of special dopamine.
The dopamine serves as the forgetting signal that stimulates
the remodeling of the engram cells to accelerate memorization
elimination. Based on the feedback of the engram cells, the
forgetting cells learn to regularize the production of dopamine
to avoid unexpected forgetting.
Protocol 1 Memorization Elimination Generator (DummyG)
Input: The target model fθ0 and its corresponding trainable
parameters θ0; the elimination set D′ ⊂ D; the user u0
that owns D′; the maximum training epochs T .
1: u0 uses small values to initialize the dummy gradient µ0,
and then, do the following iteration.
2: for t← 0 to T do
3: Update θt+1 ← θt− η 1nµt, where n is the size of D′.
4: Compute Υ = {yi|yi ← ft+1(xi), xi ∈ D′}.
5: Optimize G based on the objective function Lo =
arg minµd(‖µd − θt‖2 + ‖Υ− P‖2 + Ω).
6: Output a new dummy gradient µt ← G(µt,Υ).
7: end for
8: Return the summing of dummy gradients
∑T
i=0 µt.
Similarly, G plays the forgetting cell role in our memoriza-
tion elimination mechanism for machine learning. To eliminate
the memorization of the trained model about some specific
data, G successively produces a certain amount of dummy
gradients whose function is like the dopamine. The dummy
gradients can be applied to the neuron units of the machine
learning model and stimulate them to remodel themselves to
eliminate the memorization for the given data. Besides, G
can learn the state of the neuron units about memorization
elimination from the feedback of the target model. According
to the learning result, G regularizes the size of dummy gradi-
ents to avoid unexpected elimination. After several epochs of
learning, the target model shall quickly lose the memorization
of the specific data because of the impact of G. The detailed
construction method of G is illustrated below, and listed in
Protocol 1 (DummyG).
Represent the target model whose memorization has to be
eliminated as fθ0 , where θ0 is the trainable parameter set of
the target model. In the training process, G first initializes
the dummy gradient µ0 with a series of small random values
(empirically set to less than 10−3). The size of µ0 is the
same as θ0. Then, at the tth iteration of training, t ≥ 0, G
6
7Protocol 2 Privacy-preserving Federated Learning with Memorization Elimination (SecForget)
Input: The m users, each of which owns a local dataset Dj with size of nj ; the server S; the learning rate η; the maximum
epochs for memorization elimination T ; a gradient privacy protection function φ(·).
1: S initializes a machine learning model fθ0 and determines the loss function L(·).
2: for each iteration i = 0, 1, ... do
3: S randomly selects k users U ′ ⊂ U and publishes fθi , L(·) to U ′.
4: for each user uj ∈ U ′ do
5: if uj chooses to eliminate the memorization of fθi about its data then
6: Ask S for the permission of memorization elimination.
7: Compute the dummy gradient ∇L(Dj , θi)←DummyG(fθi , Dj , T ), and then, send νj ← φ( 1nj · ∇L(Dj , θi)) toS.
8: else
9: Compute the normal gradient with the local data ∇L(Dj , θi), and then, send νj ← φ(∇L(Dj , θi)) to S.
10: end if
11: end for
12: Receiving V = {ν1, ν2, ..., νk}, S uses the secure aggregation function SecAgg corresponding to φ(·) to compute
Λ←∑mi=1∇L(Dj , θi)←SecAgg(V, k), and update θi+1 ← θi − η · 1N · Λ, where N =∑kj=1 nj .
13: end for
14: Return the trained model fθi .
sends µt to fθt , and fθt uses µt to update θt in a similar
way to the SGD method used in federated learning, i.e.,
θt+1 ← θt− η 1nµt, where η is a hyperparameter that controls
the learning rate (mentioned in Eq. 1) and n is the size of D′.
Next, we input each sample of the elimination set xi ∈ D′
into fθt+1 and compute Υ = {yi|yi ← ft+1(xi), xi ∈ D′}.
Notably, since Forsaken only focuses on the task with finite
and discrete outputs as mentioned before, the output of the
target model yi ∈ Υ is limited to be a confidence vector with
finite dimensions by default. Υ is feedback to G and used
to optimize the dummy gradient by minimizing the following
objective.
Lo ← arg min
µd
(‖Υ− P‖2 + ‖µd − θt+1‖2 + Ω), (4)
Lo is differential w.r.t. the dummy gradient µd can be opti-
mized with the standard gradient based method, such as L-
BFGS [24] and Adam [25]. Here, the distance ‖Υ − P‖2
rules the optimization objective of the training, where P =
( 1p ,
1
p , ...,
1
p ) is the confidence vector of a “perfectly” forgotten
sample according to Definition 1. ‖µd − θt+1‖2 constrains
the maximum step length and the optimization direction.
Ω = ‖θt+1 − θ0‖2 is a regularization item that punish the
changes on the original model to avoid performance loss.
Finally, after completing the above iteration, we can get the
dummy gradient that can eliminate the memorization of the
target model about D′.
D. Memorization Elimination in Federated Learning
With the dummy gradient generator, Forsaken can simply
implement memorization elimination in federated learning as
stated in Protocol 2 (SecForget).
The procedure of SecForget refers to the privacy-
preserving federated learning scheme proposed by Google [1],
[10] but provides additional memorization elimination option
for each user. First, S initializes the trainable parameters of a
machine learning model and determines its loss function L(·).
Then, at each iteration, k users are selected to participate in
the model training. Each selected user uj has two options. If
choosing to eliminate the memorization of the model about its
data, uj invokes the generator defined in DummyG to produce
the dummy gradient; otherwise, uj uses its local data to
compute the gradient according to the standard SGD method.
In principle, the user is not allowed to choose memorization
elimination at the first few epochs of federated learning.
Furthermore, since the plaintext gradient of a single user can
be used to derive the user’s data [26], most of the existing
federated learning schemes utilize some cryptographic tools
to protect the privacy of the gradient before sending it to
S. From the design of DummyG, it can be observed that the
dummy gradient can be treated in the same way as the normal
gradient. Therefore, the mainstream gradient privacy protec-
tion methods, e.g., differential privacy [9] secret sharing [10]
and homomorphic encryption [11], can be directly used in
SecForget. Finally, S can invoke the secure aggregation
algorithm SecAgg that corresponds to the gradient privacy
protection function to get the summing result of all gradients
and use it update the current model according to Eq. 1.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we theoretically prove that Forsaken can
achieve it two design goals. Further, we discuss that Forsaken
can be extended to be an attack tool to threaten the security
of federated learning.
Data Privacy As defined in Goal 1, the security goal of
Forsaken is to inherit the same data privacy level as the
existing privacy-preserving federated learning schemes. From
the procedure of SecForget, it can be seen that the only
difference between Forsaken and other federated learning
schemes is the dummy gradient produced by DummyG. Thus,
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8we can give a formal definition of the security of Forsaken as
follows.
DEFINITION 4 (SECURITY OF FORSAKEN). We say that
Forsaken is as secure as the existing federated learning
schemes if the dummy gradient produced by DummyG can be
treated in the same way as the true gradient produced by the
standard gradient method with the privacy protection function.
Proof. According to the common gradient method used in
federated learning, like SGD [27], the normal gradient given
in Eq. 5, is the derivative of the loss function L with respect
to the trainable parameters θ, where X is the training sample.
∇L(fθ(X), θ)⇐ ∂L(fθ(X), θ)
∂θ
. (5)
As for Forsaken, the generator G in DummyG also uses the
gradient based optimizer to generate the dummy gradient. The
difference is that G treats the gradient as the trainable target,
not the model parameters. Therefore, the dummy gradient is
actually the derivative of the loss function defined in Eq. 4 with
respect to the gradient, which is mathematically expressed as
Eq. 6.
µ⇐ ∂Lo(fθ(X),∇L(fθ(X), θ))
∂∇L(fθ(X), θ) . (6)
From the perspective of the server, both the dummy gradient
and the normal gradient can be regarded as a series of
numerical matrixes that have the same function and same
size. Thus, the dummy gradient can also be correctly ap-
plied to the gradient privacy protection function like other
federated learning schemes [9], [10]. Moreover, after applying
the gradient privacy protection function, the server can only
access the aggregated gradients. From the aggregation result,
it is impossible to separate the gradient of a specific user in
polynomial time. Further, we can derive that the dummy gradi-
ent and normal gradient in SecForget are computationally
indistinguishable. In conclusion, Forsaken is at least as secure
as the existing federated learning schemes. 
Memorization Elimination. As mentioned before, Forsaken
implements memorization elimination (i.e., Goal 2) based the
dummy gradient generator whose core is defined in Eq. 4.
We now explain the correctness of Eq. 4 to lead the gener-
ator to generate effective dummy gradients for memorization
elimination. Eq. 4 is mainly composed of two parts. The first
part of Eq. 4 is based on Definition 2, which describes the
output of a machine learning model for a “totally forgetten”
sample. Definition 2 is reasonable because if we have no
knowledge about a given sample, the only way to judge its
category is guessing. A guessing output is always neutral. For
example, if a machine learning model learns nothing about
some specific samples in a 2-classification task, its output
for these samples shall not bias towards any side, that is,
approximating the guessing vector (0.5, 0.5). Notably, learning
nothing means having no relevant memorization and does not
mean having the wrong memorization that may bias the output
to the wrong side. Therefore, the first part makes the dummy
gradient to change the specific sample from “memorized” to
“totally forgetten”. Then, the second part of Eq. 4 is used to
punish the parameter change on the target model. In this way,
we can minimize the performance loss on the target model
caused by the memorization elimination. In the next section,
we further use experiments to prove the correctness of the
above setting on memorization elimination.
Extended Discussion. Similar to the membership oracle, our
dummy gradient generator can also be modified from a positive
tool to an attack tool that can launch a kind of inconspicuous
data poison attack towards federate learning.
Usually, the data poison attack is launched by the malicious
data provider [28]. By uploading the gradient computed with
mislabeled data, the attacker can mislead the server to train
a machine learning model that always gives wrong outputs
for some specific data. However, such an attack method has a
defect that it causes obvious performance loss on the trained
model for other data [29]. Our dummy gradient generator
provides an alternative method to overcome the defect. It can
be discovered that if a malicious user slightly changes the
objective function (P in Eq. 4) according to its requirement
and successively uploads the dummy gradient to the server,
the final trained model can also be misled to identify some
specific data wrongly. Even worse, as stated in the experiments
of Section VI, the attack causes little impact on the model
performance, which makes it difficult to be detected. Although
the active attack is out of the scope of this paper, we still
give an intuitive way to defend the dummy gradient based
poison attack in reality, i.e., observing the running time of each
user. Since the dummy gradient generation process is more
complicated than the normal gradient and cannot be previously
computed, the server can detect the malicious user by judging
whether its gradient generation time is unusually much longer
than other users’.
VI. EXPERIMENT IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, comprehensive experiments are conducted
to prove that Forsaken can achieve Goal 2, memorization
elimination.
A. Experiment Setup.
We utilize five different machine learning datasets to
conduct our experiments, namely CIFAR-102, CIFAR-100,
MNIST3 and News4. Among them, the former three datasets
are standard image classification datasets. The News dataset
is a commonly used text classification and clustering dataset
that has a balanced class distribution. Since the raw News
dataset is all string-type data that cannot be directly applied for
machine learning, we preprocess it by encoding the raw data
into numerical matrixes in a similar way to [12]. The detailed
information about the dataset is listed in Table II. In particular,
to evaluate the FR indicator of our scheme, we have to
2https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
3http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
4http://qwone.com/ jason/20Newsgroups/
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91) Convolution: Input image 28 × 28, windows size 5 × 5, number
of output channel 10.
2) ReLU: Calculate ReLU for each input.
3) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 2× 2.
4) Convolution: Windows size 3× 3, number of output channel 20.
5) ReLU: Calculate ReLU for each input.
6) Fully Connected Layer: Fully connected the incoming 2000 nodes
to the outgoing 500 nodes.
7) Fully Connected Layer: Fully connected the incoming 500 nodes
to the outgoing 10 nodes.
Fig. 5. The neural network trained for MNIST
1) Convolution: Input image 3×32×32, windows size 3×3, number
of output channel 64.
2) BatchNormal + ReLU: Calculate BatchNormal and ReLU for each
input.
3) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 2× 2.
4) Convolution: Windows size 3× 3, number of output channel 128.
5) BatchNormal + ReLU: Calculate BatchNormal and ReLU for each
input.
6) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 2× 2.
7) Convolution: Windows size 3× 3, number of output channel 256.
8) BatchNormal + ReLU: Calculate BatchNormal and ReLU for each
input.
9) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 2× 2.
10) Convolution: Windows size 3× 3, number of output channel 512.
11) BatchNormal + ReLU: Calculate BatchNormal and ReLU for each
input.
12) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 2× 2.
13) Fully Connected Layer: Fully connected the incoming 512 nodes
to the outgoing 100 nodes.
Fig. 6. The neural network trained for CIFAR100
train a membership oracle. Therefore, we train a membership
oracle for each dataset according to the target-shadow method
presented in [12]. Specifically, we first randomly partition all
of the target dataset into two halves. One half is used to train
the target model. The other is used to train the shadow model.
Then, we train the target and shadow models in the white-box
mode, i.e., using the same architecture and hyperparameters.
Finally, with the outputs of the two models as the training and
testing sets, we train an XGBoost [30] model to serve as the
membership oracle. The interested readers can refer to [12]
for details.
Corresponding to the five datasets, we use five neural net-
works with different architectures. To comprehensively evalu-
ate the performance of Forsaken, the five neural networks are
deliberately set to have obvious differences in parameter size.
The neural networks used for processing MNIST, CIFAR-100
and News are given in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. For CIFAR-
10, we use a previously proposed deep network architecture,
called VGG-13 [31].
Moreover, the dummy gradient is initialized with the nor-
mal random generator provided by Numpy (limited to less
than 10−3 degree). The optimizer used as the memorization
elimination generator is L-BFGS [24]. All experiments are
implemented with Pytorch, an open-source machine learning
library of python. To simulate the federated learning process,
we randomly split the training set of each dataset into a series
of subsets with the same size (100 by default), each of which is
assigned to a user as the local dataset. The users cooperatively
1) Embedding: Input word vector 1× 1000, the output word embed-
ding is 1× 100.
2) Transpose Convolution: Windows size 5 × 5, number of output
channel 128.
3) ReLU: Calculate ReLU for each input.
4) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 5× 5.
5) Convolution: Windows size 5× 5, number of output channel 128.
6) ReLU: Calculate ReLU for each input.
7) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 5× 5.
8) Convolution: Windows size 5× 5, number of output channel 256.
9) ReLU: Calculate ReLU for each input.
10) MaxPooling: Window Size 1× 35× 35.
11) Fully Connected Layer: Fully connected the incoming 128 nodes
to the outgoing 128 nodes.
12) Fully Connected Layer: Fully connected the incoming 128 nodes
to the outgoing 20 nodes.
Fig. 7. The neural network trained for News. The layers in the networks are
all used in the 1-dimension mode.
train the target model (or shadow model) according to the steps
of Protocol 2. Note that memorization elimination is always
applied for the target model in the following experiments.
The default elimination size is 200. The eliminated samples
are came from some randomly selected users. Each selected
user contributes 20 randomly chosen samples to make up the
elimination set.
TABLE II
DATASET INFORMATION
Name No. of Instances Features Classes
MNIST 70000 (10000 for testing) 28× 28 10
News 11314 (2262 for testing) 1000 20
CIFAR-10 60000 (10000 for testing) 32× 32 10
CIFAR-100 60000 (10000 for testing) 32× 32 100
B. Performance of Memorization Elimination
For memorization elimination, what the user mostly cares
about is how many data are successfully forgotten by the
trained model, which can be evaluated by FR, the indicator
proposed in Section IV. In the FR evaluation, we emphatically
observe the performance of Forsaken on the well-trained
model. To achieve this, we first train couples of target models
and shadow models with the prepared datasets based on the
common procedure of federated learning given in Protocol 2
and carefully avoid overtraining. Then, we randomly select one
user to call the memorization elimination service. Table III
summarizes the FR of the selected user’s data after apply-
ing the dummy gradients on the trained models in different
datasets. The result shows that Forsaken can transfer more than
90% eliminated samples from the training set to the known set.
However, considering the accuracy of membership inference,
the FR of Forsaken is a little lower than the expected value.
In addition, it can be discovered that the size of the training
set or the size of the dummy gradient required to be simulated
by the generator does not strongly influence the performance
of Forsaken. Even for the VGG-13 that has 14.09M dummy
gradient required to be simulated, Forsaken can still effectively
eliminate the specific memorization.
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Different from the user, the central server concerns more
about the performance loss of the target model after con-
ducting memorization elimination. To evaluate this merit, we
record the training accuracy and training loss of the target
model before and after memorization elimination, shown in
Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b). Compared with two intuitive methods
proposed in Section IV, the performance loss (reflected by the
training accuracy and training loss in the experiments) caused
by memorization elimination in Forsaken is negligible. Taken
together, the above experiment results indicate that Forsaken
can basically satisfy our design goal for memorization elimi-
nation.
TABLE III
FORGETTING RATE OF FORSAKEN ON DIFFERENT DATASETS
Dataset DummyGradient Size B.R.R A.R.R FR
MNIST 0.96M 85.54% 99% 84.68%
News 0.24M 86.37% 99.67% 86.01%
CIFAR-10 14.09M 87.33% 98% 85.58%
CIFAR-100 9.02M 95.56% 95.5% 91.26%
B.R.R → BT
BT+BF
; A.R.R → AF
AT+AF
.
FR = B.R.R × A.R.R. ×100%, i.e., Eq. 2 in Section IV.
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(a) Training accuracy change after
memorization elimination.
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(b) Training loss change after mem-
orization elimination.
Fig. 8. The performance change of the target model after conducting
Forsaken, Baseline-1 and Baseline-2.
C. Effect Factors for Memorization Elimination
After evaluating the whole performance, we further conduct
experiments to analyse some key factors that possibly affect
the performance of Forsaken, namely the eliminated data
size, the training iterations of the dummy gradient generator
and overtraining. The experiments in this section are mainly
performed on two datasets, MNIST and News, which severally
represent the two classical tasks of machine learning, image
classification and text classification.
Eliminated Data Size. For Forsaken, the complexity of the
dummy gradient generator is positively related to the elim-
inated data size. Here, we conduct experiments to test the
performance change of Forsaken with variable eliminated data
sizes. Usually, there can be only a small part of the users that
launch memorization elimination at the same time, Therefore,
we set the eliminated size varied from 50 to 300 (about 1%
of the total training set) in the experiments. Fig. 9 plots the
experiment result. The increased eliminated data size leads
to a slight reduction in FR for Forsaken. Besides, from the
changes of the target model’s accuracy on the training and
testing sets, we can observe that the memorization elimination
hardly affects the performance of the target model, even the
eliminated size reaches 300. The phenomenon shows that
Forsaken is robust to the modest change of eliminated data
size.
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(a) The change of FR with different
elimination sizes for MNIST.
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(b) The change of FR with different
elimination sizes for News.
Fig. 9. The performance change of Forsaken with different elimination sizes.
Diff.Train.Acc and Diff.Test.Acc mean the difference of the training/testing
accuracy before and after conducting Forsaken, respectively.
Training Iteration of Generator. Since the dummy gradient
generator is implemented by the gradient based optimizer,
its performance is strongly influenced by the training itera-
tion. Fig. 10 shows the performance change of memorization
elimination with increasing iterations. Commonly, the dummy
gradient generator reaches its best performance after tens of
iterations and ends its iteration. In the experiments, we force
the generator to additionally train for some extra iterations to
better illustrate its performance. Once the best point is reached,
more training iterations hardly reduce FR but cause more and
more accuracy loss of the target model. The reason is that
according to our design of the generator, overtraining cannot
cancel the eliminated memorization; however, it can cause
over elimination of unrelated memorization, which lowers the
accuracy of the target model. In practical,
Moreover, the efficiency of memorization elimination is
also significant merit to evaluate Forsaken. Concretely, the
efficiency of Forsaken is mainly affected by two factors,
the training iterations of the generator and the size of the
dummy gradient required to be simulated. Table IV reflects
the running time to accomplish one user’s memorization elim-
ination with different iteration numbers and different sizes of
neural networks. The experiments are performed with a laptop,
equipped with Intel Core i7-7200 CPU @2.50Ghz and 8GB
RAM (no GPU acceleration). The experiment results show that
the dummy gradient generation process can be completed in
minutes, even for the neural network with 14.09M parameters.
Overtraining. Referring to the former research [8], over-
training is always tightly related to the machine learning
memorization. Loosely speaking, overtraining brings deeper
and stronger memorization of the trained model towards the
training set and leads to worse performance on the unknown
data set. Fig. 11 shows a typical example of overtraining,
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(a) The FR at each iteration of the dummy gradient generator for
MNIST.
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(b) The FR at each iteration of the dummy gradient generator for News.
Fig. 10. The FR of Forsaken at each iteration of the dummy gradient
generator.
TABLE IV
EFFICIENCY OF MEMORIZATION ELIMINATION
Iteration Running Time (s)
MNIST News CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
10 3.88 14.78 59.89 56.01
15 6.13 22.34 86.97 88.81
20 8.82 29.65 117.51 124.14
25 11.93 36.99 152.71 164.82
30 15.64 44.43 182.48 209.97
which occurs by training the target model with only half of
the training set for News. At the first few epochs, the testing
loss drops rapidly until reaching the best point. After the point,
the trend of testing loss is reversed, i.e., beginning to increase,
which means the model is overtrained. To evaluate Forsaken
versus overtraining, we record the memorization elimination
results at the different stages of model training, including be-
fore and after overtraining. Not surprisingly, the memorization
is successfully eliminated no matter overtraining occurs or
not. Nonetheless, for the overtrained model, Forsaken has a
better performance on memorization elimination. The reason
is that the overtrained model usually has more redundant
memorization on the training set, which leaves more space
for Forsaken to remodel the model to operate memorization
elimination.
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Fig. 11. The performance of Forsaken versus overtraining
D. Memorization Elimination for Language Model
For language model, Carlini et al. [8] introduces an efficient
way to measure the degree of the memorization for a given
sequence s[r], which can be mathematically expressed as the
following equation.
exposureθ(s[r]) = − log2
∫ Pθ(s[r])
0
ρ(x)dx, (7)
where exposureθ(s[r]) is the memorization degree; Pθ(s[r])
is the log-perplexity of s[r] under the machine learning model
fθ; ρ(·) is a skew-normal function with mean µ, standard
derivation σ2 and skew α. Log-perplexity is a common in-
dicator to evaluate how “surpriese” the language model is to
see a given sequence, which can computed according to Eq. 8.
Pθ(s[r]) =
n∑
i=1
(− log2 Pr(xi|fθ(x1...xi−1))). (8)
Notably, exposure is a specially defined indicator that can
only be applied to the sequence model, e.g, language model.
As stated in [8], the risk of a given sequence to be extracted
by an adversary is positively related to exposure.
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Fig. 12. Comparing FR and test loss to exposure across different training
iterations of the dummy gradient generator.
To further evaluate the effectiveness of Forsaken, we use
the Penn TreeBank (PTB) dataset5 to train a language model
5https://github.com/tomsercu/lstm/tree/master/dat
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with a two-layer LSTM [32] that has 512 hidden units.
During the training process, we insert 200 canaries6 into ten
different users’ local set. The 200 canaries are treated as
the eliminated set. After 100 epochs of training, we conduct
memorization elimination. Fig. 12 plots the experiment result,
where exposure is the averaged value of the 200 canaries.
It can be discovered that exposure deceases to about 1.2
along with the training of our dummy gradient generator.
Carlini’s experiment [8] points out that the success probability
for the adversary to extract a given sequence is negligible when
exposure is less than 10. Therefore, the above experiment
shows that Forsaken can significantly lower the probability of
the adversary to extract the user’s private from the unintended
memorization. Meanwhile, from the test loss change (increase
about 10%), we can conclude that the performance loss caused
by the memorization elimination is totally acceptable.
VII. RELATED WORK
A significant amount of related work about machine learn-
ing security inspires our work in this paper.
Federated learning. Forsaken is basically designed for the
emerging federated learning technique, which is first proposed
by Google for privacy-preserving machine learning model
training in the mobile crowdsensing scenario [1]. Federated
learning significantly improves the security level of traditional
distributed learning by raising the attack object from data to
gradient. Nevertheless, Bagdasaryan et al.pointed out that the
gradient was not as secure as Google declared, and vulnerable
to the adversarial example attack [33]. Therefore, the followup
work of federated learning put a tremendous amount of effort
into designing protecting the gradient privacy through different
cryptographic tools, e.g., secret sharing [10], differential pri-
vacy [9], and homomorphic encryption [11]. The core of all the
methods is that they significantly increase the attack hardness
of the attacker by using the secure gradient aggregation
method to implement the gradient model update [29], which
can also be used in Forsaken.
Although massive researches have been done on federated
learning, there is still an unresolved practical problem, which
is that none of them consider how to let a user securely quit
from a learning federation. After all, people are more and
more realizing the importance of individual privacy, and the
GDPR [7] released by the European Union has ruled that a
natural person should have the right to choose to remain or
withdraw its private data without special statement.
Membership Inference. The most important evaluation tool
used in Forsaken is the membership inference algorithm, i.e.,
membership oracle. The research of membership inference
is first inspired by the membership privacy problem while
deploying machine learning as a service [14]. Given a trained
model f(·), a training set D and an arbitrary sample x,
membership inference answers the question whether x is a
member of D based on the model output f(x). Further, it
makes it possible to determine whether the memorization
6Canary is a kind of specially generated sequence defined in [8].
of f(·) about the pattern of x is directly trained by x, an
individual person’s private information in federated learning,
or derived from other similar data.
The early membership inference towards machine learn-
ing used multiple shadows models to train the membership
oracle [14], which had to cost considerable computation re-
sources. Later, the experiments of Salem et al. [12] showed
that even with only one shadow model, the membership oracle
could still work. Considering the efficiency and practicality
under the federated learning scenario, we do not add the
membership inference performance as a part of the optimiza-
tion objective for the dummy gradient generator. However,
the principle of membership inference inspires us a lot to
define our concept of memorization elimination for federated
learning.
Memorization of Machine Learning. Few of the present
works focus on the security of the memorization in machine
learning. Song et al. [34] proposed several encoding methods
that made the model to secretly “memorize” the training
data in the training process. Correspondingly, the adversary
could extract the memorized data from the trained model
based on the specially designed decoding method, In fact, the
memorization mentioned in [34] is intentionally backdoored
by the adversary, and to obtain the memorization, the training
procedure (i.e., the normal loss function) has to be changed.
Carlini et al. [8] studied the unintentional memorization phe-
nomenon in the language model and gave an excellent method
to measure its exposure level. Besides the applicable range,
the critical difference of the above two works and ours is that
they focus on how to extract or measure the memorization
of machine learning, but ours tries to eliminate the specific
memorization.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To date, most of the researches about federated learning
concentrated on how to efficiently and securely memorize
the training set. However, there was still a lack of research
on how to help the user eliminate unexpected memorization.
In this paper, we emphatically discussed this problem and
proposed Forsaken, a new framework of federated learning
that provided the memorization elimination service for the
user. To implement Forsaken, we first presented a quantified
indicator, called forgetting rate, to measure the performance of
memorization elimination. Then, inspired by the memorization
management mechanism of the human body, we proposed a
“learn to forget” method to achieve memorization elimination
for machine learning. In the method, the user could stimu-
late the neurons of a machine learning model to eliminate
the memorization of the specific data by training a dummy
gradient generator. In particular, the dummy gradient could
be treated according to the common procedure of federated
learning, which indirectly ensured the security of Forsaken.
Although a novel memorization elimination method was
proposed, there were still several areas where our work was
limited in scope: 1) Forsaken was designed to fit the classifi-
cation task of machine learning and could not directly handle
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other types of tasks, e.g., regression and clustering. 2) Al-
though only several epochs were required to train the dummy
gradient generator, the computation overhead of memorization
elimination was still too high for some energy-limited devices
when the size of the neural network parameters was large.
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